-104 -inquiry, Latin American Thought contributes to the study of philosophy by developing a unique methodological arena for future investigations through innovative ways to do philosophy in Latin America. In Latin American Thought, Susanna Nuccetelli suggests a Latin American response to traditional philosophical problems by blending historical perspectives with thematic views while simultaneously offering philosophical questions of current interest. At the intersection of this methodological juncture, thematic and historical, is where Nuccetelli finds a new space for the articulation of Latin American philosophical concerns. While developing some interesting and thought provoking arguments, the author maintains the discussions on current polemic historical and thematic affecting Latin America. Ultimately, by questioning if it is possible to understand Latin American culture without a constant reference to other western traditions, insofar as one does not negate the impact of the conquest of the Americas, but rather uncovers the uniqueness of Latin American tradition in the midst of an inevitable amalgamation of ideas and perspectives, Nuccetelli creates a methodological path where these concerns are identified and developed through a rhetorical arena for the unfolding of novel answers. Latin American Thought, is a persuasive academic and philosophical invitation to adopt a cautious attitude concluding that, "the ancient indigenous peoples of Latin America had cultures that were rich and insightful in ways that deserve respect" (88).
Latin American Thought develops its arguments, while it further explores perspectives contributing to the creation of an intellectual arena for Latin American issues conducive to pondering and reflection. A set of thoughtful provoking questions end each chapter making its reading a continuous contemplation and reflection on philosophy. The book is more than an introductory study to the greatest and most decisive historical problems in philosophy through the views and perspectives of both Latin American and Western traditional cultures. In the preface of the book, Nuccetelli gives a clear and concise description of the themes and major issues developed in each chapter, therefore, this review wants to emphasize the unique methodological aspect of its inquiry and explore some of the original responses to perennial problems offered by the author's approach in dealing with Latin American philosophy. Latin American Thought's method allows for an understanding of traditional philosophical issues while maintaining a close focus on Latin America's conceptual reality.
The perennial problems explored by the author rest on fundamental questions about humanity and the world. The articulation of these questions constructs a matrix of comparisons between the major traditional cultures of Latin America and those of the Western World. By critically examining, and in some instances radically questioning the traditional western views on rationalism and empiricism as sources of truth and reality, Nuccetelli embraces the natives' belief system of the universe as one more plausible rational discourse for understanding the human condition and consequently making Latin American cultures of equal value as of other western traditions when understanding the world. Not solely in a comparative narrative, but rather with compelling arguments, the author is able to challenge the traditional rationalist and empirical theories, through the articulation of other alternative positions, to show how cultures of Latin America can successfully qualify to be rational through the possession of critical thinking and practice of intellectual skills. By elucidating the Mayan books of Chilam Balam and their rich magical description of events in the natural world, Nuccetelli argues that Mayan beliefs "would fall beyond the common norms of cognitive rationality altogether, whether empirical or a priori rationality." (46) This assertion begins the author's articulation of novel responses to traditional questions, of what is true and real, from a Latin American perspective. By uncovering the intrinsic order and understanding contained in folk cosmology capable of providing knowledge about the world, the author exalts the philosophical value of Latin American cultures.
For Nuccetelli, Latin American cultures have shown serious concern for understanding basic questions about the origin of the universe and the human condition. By showing how folk cosmologies from indigenous groups from Latin American contain coherent views of natural events, representative of their capacity for certainty and order, the author asserts their essential contribution to the understanding of the natural world. Again Nuccetelli states, "Surely, the view that the ancient Aztecs went about making practical tools in ways that differed radically from, say, those of early modern Westerners is pluralistic. But is it relativist?" (80). Through the use of 'pluralism without relativism,' Nuccetelli allows the evaluation of Latin American cultures' philosophical and scientific understanding in terms of efficiency at performing certain tasks related to the interaction with the natural world. This approach demonstrates that groups like the Aztecs and Mayans pursued fundamental cognitive practices and therefore can be consider as philosophical as the traditional western perspectives. For Nuccetelli, "the cultures of the indigenous peoples of Latin America have been disparaged by a long and varied tradition of ethnocentricism…"(88). The next question raised by Nuccetelli is whether indigenous Latin Americans reach an understanding of the natural world similar to that afforded by Western philosophy and science. By elucidating and examining the cosmogonical descriptions and cosmological narrative from the PopolVuhl and other native writings, she argues: " If the speculation of the pre-Socratics about the origins of the universe count as philosophy, must we not say the same about cosmologies and the belief systems held by the ancient native peoples of Latin America?" (55). By considering different arguments asserting philosophy as a universal intellectual discipline denoted for its love of wisdom, rigour, cognitive relevance and plausibility, the author remarks on the similarities underlying both pre-Socratic and Latin American indigenous cosmologies to open the debate whether there is a characteristically Latin American Philosophy that could stand in comparison with Western traditions.
Latin American Thought addresses important aspects of the Conquest while emphasizes on the controversy surrounding the often morally justified colonization of indigenous people in the name of civilization. However, Nuccetelli explores the ethical validity of the Conquest in terms of the notion of right. While discussing the moral dilemma contained in the notion of human rights, the author's arguments strongly rely upon some of the resulting unavoidable conflicts between Latin American and Western cultures and religions, and their different values when understanding the world. An analysis of the chronicles from the conquest clearly illustrate how social values, moral qualities and customs collide and result in a violent encounter between Europe and Indians:" Within Columbus's world view, generosity and peacefulness amounted to inferior qualities, incompatible with characteristics that Europeans of the end of the fifteenth century thought it desirable for men to have. As Beatriz Pastor Bodmer points out, among these were individualism and belligerence, both required by the spirit of enterprise that was expected of men of action in the early modern period"(99).
One of the most decisive and influential moments in the history of Latin America is the conquest by Spain and Portugal through the justification as well as the legalization of practices during this period. Furthermore, the events subsequent to 1492 changed the shape of Latin America and its values, views, cultures and traditions. From a historical perspective, Nuccetelli discusses two basic arguments presented by Juan Ginés de Sepulveda, Spanish philosopher and clergyman, to justify such actions: 1) The conquest was permissible, since the Indians had -105 -not standard form of government or social organization, and 2) The Indians were considered to be naturally barbaric, and therefore subject to subordination and subjugation by civilized conquistadores. This second premise however is based on Aristotle's conception of natural justification for considering that "some people are natural slaves and others whose nature is more civilized" (104). According to the author, "the best argument available to Sepúlveda could be recast as follows:
1. There is empirical evidence that some groups of Indians regularly engaged in practices that are morally wrong, 2. People who regularly engage in practices that are wrong are natural slaves. Therefore, 3. Some groups of Indians were natural slaves"(106). When examining Sepulveda's conclusion, Nuccetelli shows how premise two (2) can only be supported under the basis of authority, forcing us to accept Aristotle as an expert on the subject of cross-cultural evaluation. This obviously begs the question for evidence about Aristotle's claims on cross-cultural evaluation, to which the author is undoubtedly suspicious. For the author, this kind of arguments must be rejected, "not just because they made a fallacious appeal to Aristotle's authority. They are also vulnerable to a different sort of objection: Why should we think that people's ways of life are evidence of an essential nature? On the basis of the same information available to Sepulveda, several other hypothesis were possible-and that was as clear to philosophers and clergymen within the tradition of the Roman Catholic Church as to other thinkers outside that tradition"(109). Even though for Nuccetelli the argument is valid because the first premise seems true and it follows the conclusion, the argument lacks universal generalization in its premises, making Sepulveda's conclusion plausible but not fully supported. The juncture of historical premise (1) and thematic premise (2) exemplifies Nuccetelli's methodology. However, for the author the premises of the argument rest on the Aristotelian doctrine concerning that some people are natural slaves and but does not have any persuasive reason to be accepted, therefore making it an invalid and unsubstantiated argument, due to their intrinsic contingency. This methodological approach elucidates what I consider to be the author's most fascinating and brilliant form of argumentation. By questioning the arguments' propositions at the level of their historical and thematic validity, Nuccetelli evaluates the thematic authority in terms of their historical legitimacy and reveals intrinsic contradictions in their conclusive evidence making the arguments unsound. By challenging the impact of their subject matter and it's content in the midst of contemporary pluralism, while debunking their unsupported premises, Nuccetelli once again creates the philosophical arena for a Latin American novel response. The space for Latin American Philosophy begins its construction through a series of engaging, well researched, and well crafted arguments conducive to show that Latin America contains an intellectual tradition capable of questioning and responding to historical and thematic philosophical problems. This particular moral dilemma on human rights serves Nuccetelli methodological style to combine syllogistic arguments with conceptual arguments, while debunking the inconsistency of the universality implied on their conclusions. This methodological and argumentative style is present throughout the entire book.
After a close examination of argumentative moral prima facie premises and assessing the different ethical values of Spaniards and Portuguese conquistadores, Nuccetelli questions the efficacy of Modern Europeans' notion of human rights by confronting the moral justification of the Conquest and its holy and politically justification. Garcilaso de la Vega, a mestizo from Peru, and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Spanish philosopher and clergyman are some of the many characters that represent the moral paradigm of the Conquest. The concurrent support for a holy justification of the conquest and the fervent condemnation of the abuses perpetuated by the conquistadores makes the reading of this historical instance a fascinating, yet somewhat poignant philosophical exercise. Nuccetelli's arguments, however, center the discussion upon the reasons behind the justification of slavery, expropriation of land, and waging war against the native people of Latin America claiming that the social arrangements, like the 'encomiendas', were plainly in violation of the most basic rights of nations and people. Controversial and insightful moral arguments about the Conquest develops Nuccetelli's narrative with detailed discussions on Bartolome de las Casas progressive social views. Characterized as an indefatigable pursuer of novel solutions to the problems of moral and political philosophy created by the Conquest, this Dominican theologian and philosopher "attacked those who denied that the Indians were fully human"(115). Regardless of the las Casas fervent faith in the Catholic Church, his humanistic ideas promoted the utilization of peaceful means to persuade the Indians adoption of the Christian faith. As Nuccetelli shows, las Casas had several rivals and enemies; nevertheless, he advocated the treatment of the Indians as rational human beings therefore contributing to the actual improvement in the lives of the indigenous people by contesting the traditional philosophical natural law and natural right.
Following Latin American Thought's historical approach, the book immerses the reader in some of the most important themes developed during Iberian Scholasticism (137). In this section of the book, the author provides an examination of novel responses to those perennial philosophical problems adopted by Latin American thinkers. In search for the intellectual character of Latin Americans, Nuccetelli explores the phenomena of 'cultural dependence' and the implications on the political, social and cultural realms from Colonial Rule to Independence. Rhetorically, the book examines and recognizes the influence of the Indians on Colonial practices, while simultaneously questions the effect on the current reality of Latin America. Through a thematic examination of Scholastic's transitional views on science and philosophy, the book discusses the paradigms that have governed conceptual frameworks and their authority on old accounts of scientific traditions, in front of modern empiricism and rationalism. Through the views of thinkers like José de Acosta, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, Simón Bolivar, and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the author prepares the arena for the novel Iberian and Latin America responses by arguing that "…scholasticism was unable to explain much of the new, empirically based evidence and that it must therefore be replaced by modern science and philosophy"(142). For the author, the first step towards an acknowledgment of the vast contributions from Latin American thinkers is to recognize their original response to issues concerning the mapping of the world, intellectual authority, feminism, the constitution of new political movements, and ethnic stereotypes, as part of the deployment of the most influential ideas and views in contemporary Latin America.
I would like to suggest that the thinkers discussed in the final two sections of Latin American Thought create the platform from which political sovereignty and cultural identity are deployed and unfolded toward understanding of the current ideology in Latin America. According to Nuccetelli, "From the late nineteenth century to the present a topic of perennial concern to Latin Americans has been their collective identity" (179). This concern situates the history of Latin America in its latest moment by questioning the most effective method by which we can recognize and maintain uniqueness in the midst of a new cultural influence by U.S. Regardless of the significant influence and impact of Positivism in Latin America, the author begins her construction by showing how the works of Domingo Sarmiento, Leopoldo Zea, José Enrique Rodó and Joao Cruz Costa represent an 'autochthonous positivism' to the quest for -106 -identity. A close examination of what the author considers paradigm cases for their conflicting evaluations and notorious consequences, allows a special focus on Brazil and Mexico positivist influence in Latin America. The adoption of Comte and Spencer positivism had different consequences in the development of social reforms and political institutions by putting forward views on social progress, race, identity, and technology that has fueled philosophical debates to this day. The predominant ideology on human progress defended by these thinkers created an eclectic theoretical framework entangled with traditional Mexican belief system rooted in folk customs, gave raise to what Zea has referred as "inferiority complex among Mexicans and other Latin Americans with respect to powerful nations of the West"(191). An analysis and reconstruction of some of the basic arguments by Jose Enrique Rodó and Domingo Sarmiento on the influences of the west and its political consequences, exemplifies Nuccetelli's paradigmic aspect of Latin America identity: "Like Sarmiento's Facundo, Rodó's Ariel responds to a political agenda, but the contents of these agendas are different. The former is devoted to vindicating the modern, capitalist standards of the United States whereas the latter rejects such a model, defending instead values he considers essential to Latin Americans: roughly, those they have allegedly inherited from ancient Greek and Christian Roman cultures. But what could Latin American possibly have inherited from cultures as remote as those of ancient Greece and Rome? In Rodó's view, nothing less than civilization itself " (195) .
The concept of civilization in the narrative of Nuccetelli's text unfolds the elements constituting Latin America Identity. A close examination of philosophical perennial problems and the novel responses proposed by the author from a Latin American perspective allows for a "direct reference approach" (xxi) when questioning the commonality and differences between different cultures and nations. This distinctive approach by the author characterizes the methodology using a descriptive judgment of ethnic groups in Latin America rather than an evaluative one. By appealing to José Mariátegui's view of the collective identity of Latin America and his descriptive claim on 'Indo-Hispanic Americans,' permits the author a resolution to the question of "whether Latin Americans and their descendants in various geographic locations do in fact have anything in common"(232). This descriptive methodology constitutes, once again, a successful attempt by the author to suggest a different response to philosophical problems adopted by Latin America. A suspicious and in some cases careful examination of the current debate about the proper name for Latin Americans makes the discussion on the common identity of Latinos and Hispanics interesting and provocative.
In the final section of the book, three distinguished questions arrive to the conclusion that the perspectives by philosophers from Latin America had ideas that are philosophically appealing, concluding that there is philosophy in Latin American thought "even though it is not always philosophers who have produced it"(252). By asking if there is some characteristically Latin American Philosophy? How is Latin American Philosophy possible?, and Latin American Thought versus Latin American Philosophy, Nuccetelli claims that indeed philosophical ideas have flourished from the roots of rational arguments bearing social, cultural, and historical factors in Latin America. The claim asserting the plurality of sources for philosophical ideas in Latin America, suggests progress in motivating and inviting fertile work in philosophy upon the endemic diverse experience of what constitute Hispanic America.
Overall, Latin American Thought is an outstanding resource for students and intellectuals who have a keen interest in the current debate about what constitutes Latin American tradition because it provides analyses and criticism from within philosophy and its perennial problems adapted by Latin American thinkers. This text shows not only the problems and values of Latin American thinking, but goes beyond that thinking to open up new paths for novel methodologies filled with extended proofs, which are models of further clarity when embarking in the fascinating philosophical journey across Latin and Hispanic America.
My main reservation about the book concerns the limited extent to which Nuccetelli expands the question of the role of philosophy in Latin America. As a reader, one cannot help but to be confronted by the traditional and current social, political, and economic conditions in Latin America, wondering about the responsibility that philosophy has in the articulation of possible and viable solutions. Despite this, Susana Nuccetelli's Latin American Thought has some important and engaging arguments conducive to a profound understanding of our reality as Latin Americans. I believe this text continues to cultivate the ground where philosophy in Latin American thought provide novel responses but furthers calls into attention the responsibility of the philosophical discourse in the necessary social, educational, and political changes in our societies. This book is clearly a compelling work that provokes a renewed discussion of what Latin American thought has achieved and what can achieve in the future. The book provides a deeply developed vision of the rich and insightful ways Latin American thinkers have produced and will continue to practice philosophy.
Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology, edited by Robert Figueroa and Sandra
Harding. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Reviewed by Eduardo Mendieta

Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY
This is a wonderful, indispensable, and important collection of essays, even if not all the essays in it measure up to the highest standards raised by the essays themselves as a whole. The book gathered what I take to be the best essays from the thirty-six presentations that were held at the four divisional meetings of the APA from December 2000 to December 2001. The project arose from a grant from the National Science Foundation to the American Philosophical Association to explore and develop research activities on the relationship between diversity and the philosophy of science. Professor Sandra Harding and Professor Robert Figueroa managed the grant for the APA, and were in charge of editing the volume that emerged from the presentations and research activities sponsored by the grant. It is clear that diversity was understood in the broadest possible sense; thus, in the volume, we encounter essays that factor in gender and sexual preference, cultural, ethnic, racial, and disciplinary differences. The approach on the philosophy of science remained focused on science studies, standpoint epistemologies, and post-positivist science studies. Perhaps other forms of philosophy of science excused themselves by their own perspective on the relationship between culture and science. Yet, at least some reflection on the absence of other traditions on the philosophy of science would have been welcome. Nonetheless, this is a fascinating and extremely welcome contribution to the philosophy of science, to science studies, and to a much broader field of study, namely to the study of cultures as such. Some of the essays offer prodigiously annotated discussions of recent developments in standpoint epistemologies, feminist epistemology, postcolonial science studies and science studies, and as such they will be extremely useful research tools.
The book is divided into three sections. In a first section, entitled "Sciences in Cultures, and Cultures in Science" we find the essays that explore the dialectical tension, or rather codetermination of science and culture. This co-determination is not just disabling but also, and perhaps most importantly, enabling. Cultures not only condition the very tools and objects of science, but also determine the conceptual horizon and mode of approach to those entities that science studies. In this way, cultures both hinder but also make possible the "scientific treatment" of that which can be objectified. In this section of the book, therefore, we find some of the best essays in the volume. The essay by Robert Hood on activist science, or what he calls crisis science, is a very important analysis of the ways in which science is applied differently under different geopolitical circumstances, and how, given the urgency of the challenge it faces, it may have to circumvent, and even undermine, some of its criteria of scientificity. The essay by Alison Wyle is a tour de force as it brings us up to date on the renewal of standpoint epistemologies, while trying to transform and correct its reach and foundations. Harding's essay is also a wonderful, synoptic overview of the ways in which postcolonial theories can and do converge with science studies, in particular, those of the postpositivist type. Yet, as Harding points out, science studies has been slow, even reticent, to acknowledge that its logical steps ought to lead it to question the relationship between politics and the production of knowledge and science. Science studies must make the geopolitical turn: science itself is not innocent of the entanglements of imperial histories and designs. Lacey's essay on seeds is an extremely timely intervention, particularly as we face the "food wars" between Europe and its allies in the so-called Third World, and the United States's Agro-Bio-Engineering cartel that controls almost the entire production of Genetically Modified crops 1 . The essay by Robert Crease is a delightfully written essay about a most atrocious and deplorable event in the nefarious history of the United States's nuclear weapons program. The experimental explosion of nuclear devices in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, close to the Marshall Islands, has left one of the most egregious examples of the unintended, and always unforeseeable, consequences of big science gone awry. Crease's conclusion, however, must be challenged on the grounds of the evidence that he himself has elicited, evidence that is carefully adduced and to which he has had ample access as a historian of the Brookhaven National Laboratory. Crease concludes: "The story of the Marshall Islands exposure victims, I think, embodies another catastrophe story, one that involves the scientific dimension. The catastrophe is brought about not by the technical replacing the social -but just the opposite: by ceasing to inform practical action, ceasing to provide the basis for critique of a situation." (122, my italics.) This is a rather disturbing conclusion, one which also does not follow from the narrative that was so artfully and eloquently woven about the narrow mindedness of the scientist at Brookhaven in charge of tracking the devastation unleashed upon the Rongelapse, inhabitants of the particular Marshall islands that had fallout contamination. In this case, as Crease had demonstrated, it was the Brookhaven scientists's attempt to subordinate everything to their standards of science, and their practices of those standards, that resulted in a series of "exploding coconuts" -Had these scientist taken into consideration the cultural and social, they would have realized that their technical means were inappropriate, and even counterproductive.
The next section of the book is entitled "Classifying People: Science and Technology at our Service." I think that the pieces by Naomi Zack, Sara Goering, and Margaret Cuonzo are extremely important contributions to race studies, queer theory and beauty studies. I think that we will all be fairly fascinated and shocked to discover that many scientists skewed their scientific reports for fear of appearing to condone or even consider that their subjects of study exhibited "homosexual" behavior. This raises a very important point that I wished this grant would have given space to explore, namely, the issue of the relationship between the social psychology of the researcher and the science scientists produce. While this question is taken up in the biographies of scientists, it really has not received sufficient philosophical consideration. The works of Donna Haraway, as well as those of Evelyn Fox Keller, and Katherine Hayles have raised the question of the "credible witness" (Haraway's term), but a more engaged and in-depth discussion is forthcoming. This discussion would take up the issue of the "persona" of the scientist, where persona includes not just their temperament, but also all the ideological inclinations and delusions that form part of that scientist's conceptual repertoire.
The essay by Anita Silvers and Michael Ashley Stein is a welcome addition to disabilities studies, and legal genomics (to coin a phrase), that is, the way in which genomic advances ought to be addressed by law. The essay is truly a wonderful exercise in the application of insights and conceptual gains from one field into another, and I hope more Intellectual Property Rights lawyers, and lawyers working for the office of patents and copyrights read this. I think that applying the rules and approaches used in disabilities cases to the emerging field of genetic screening, and potential negative outcomes, is the right way to go and a profoundly insightful approach. Yet the essay takes as one of its points of departure a series of assumptions that have been brought under severe criticism by Richard Lewontin and Evelyn Fox Keller, to name only the most prominent names in the field. The assumption I am referring to is the ideology of genetic determinism. As Silvers and Stein write: "Eventually, genomics should be able to tell us which, if any, elements of human behavior are the result of biological inheritance. In principle, therefore, genomics could eliminate the unsubstantiated extrapolations that result in genotypes being made into proxies and thereby becoming instruments of discriminatory practice." (136, my italics). First, as Lewontin has pointed out, the assumption that guides this hope is based on bad science. Genes do not determined human beings. Human beings, and in general all living beings are result of what Lewontin calls the triple helix: genotypes, phenotypes, and environment. Today, we would have to add to it the proteome (the code the determines the production of proteins, which allow the genome to write the phenotype, which interacts with very unique and non-repeatable bio-chemical conditions). 2 The insights into how disabilities studies can help us prepare for the "posthuman" future of a society in which we may have to struggle against invidious distinctions between the "invalids" and "valids," to use the language of the prophetic and dystopian film Gattaca, stand even if we dispense with the avowed genetic determinism of the authors.
The third and final section of the book, entitled "Tradition and Modernity: Issues in Philosophies of Technological Change" contains two essays. The essay by Andrew Feenberg is a very useful essay because it can help us chart the ways in which technologies are imposed by geopolitical imperatives, but also how culture determines the way science and culture are enacted. The last essay by Junichi Murata offers us a glimpse into the ways in which technology and modernization were synthesized in Japan during the early part of the 20th century. This last section should have contained more essays, essays that dispute and explore the very idea that "we have been" and are the best exemplar (we here means putative "Western" culture), of the modern. Here, cross-cultural analysis can be symmetrically complemented with intra-cultural analysis, that is to say, the kinds of difference Feenberg tracked between Japanese and Western science could also be tracked within the West. For instance, a philosophical analysis of the difference between Apple, IBM, and Microsoft would have been very illustrative of the kind of theses that Feenberg so eloquently articulates. Another area of exploration that would have helped beef up this last section would have been a hypothetical confrontation between Donna Haraway and Vandana Shiva. They both advocate different forms of feminism and posthuman spirituality, yet they end up on different sides when it comes down to the question of technology, and even modernity. And, as long as I am listing my desiderata, I might as well note that I wish Robert Figueroa had included something from his own research satchel, that is, from his studies in environmental racism, and his studies on deep ecology. Be that as it may, this is a wonderful collection of essays, one that should be of use not just to philosophers of science, but also to all thinkers who are laboring at the borderlands where culture and science, empires and peoples, technology and the lifeworld, meet. Combining Continental and Latin American philosophical perspectives, Professor Schutte's work is a sustained effort to show how concepts influence the shapes of our subjectivities and the powers of our agency, thus opening the possibilities to think and to live differently, especially for women. While doing this, she has built important interpretive bridges between feminism, postcolonialism, European, and Latin American thought.
INTERVIEWS
At the Crossroads of Nietzschean and Latin American Feminism: An Interview with Ofelia Schutte, Professor of Women's Studies and Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Women's Studies at the University of South Florida, Tampa, FL
Interviewed by Ivan Márquez
Marquez: You are known as a philosopher who specializes in Nietzsche, feminism, and Latin American philosophy. Of all philosophers, why Nietzsche?
Schutte: Nietzsche is a wonderful philosopher, yet insufficiently appreciated for his contributions to philosophy. Even to this day, he continues to be undervalued in the philosophy canon. Initially, reading Nietzsche energized my distrust of all kinds of dogmatisms, especially the legacy of religion's influence over philosophy. You may think that philosophy's distinctness from religion is an old matter dating at least from the time of the ancient Greeks, and at any rate reestablished in modern times through Descartes, Hume, the Enlightenment, and early 19 th centur y philosophy. What Nietzsche did, however, was very specific and, in my view, uniquely effective. His argument does not begin with the contrast between reason and faith. What he does is uncover the effects that certain forms of religious beliefs have on the psyche, for example, by analyzing the logic and psychological effects of concepts such as guilt, punishment, and the dualism of good and evil. In other words, Nietzsche's analysis of concepts reaches not only the conscious mind but also important elements of the unconscious. His way of philosophizing addresses us both as thinking beings and as subjects of desire and action. If one is looking for philosophers that will address not only a brainy interlocutor but someone of flesh and blood, a being with feelings, desires, passions and a drive to create something of value, then Nietzsche will certainly be one's kind of philosopher. His work continues to engage me to this day. I find it especially relevant to the world we live in even if, of course, I do not always agree with his position on every issue. One of the most enduring things about Nietzsche's work is his critique of those cultural formations that reduce, rather than enhance, human beings' capacity for creative activities in every sphere of existence.
Marquez: Many feminists and non-feminists find the pairing of Nietzsche and feminism to be an unlikely match. What brings them together in your philosophical research?
Schutte: It used to be the case that the thought of a "Nietzschean feminism" was unimaginable, at least in the United States, several decades ago. But this is no longer the case. Today I consider myself a Nietzschean feminist, among many other things-for example, a Latin America/Latina and postcolonial feminist. My identity is a hybrid one. Nietzsche was a philosopher who did not believe in such a thing as cultural purity. His extraordinary analysis of the important Dionysian artistic elements in Greek tragedy shook up the established understanding of the Greeks at the time that he published his first book, The Birth of Tragedy. What I tried to do in my first book, Beyond Nihilism, was to bring a feminist voice to the reading and interpretation of Nietzsche's works. I believe that at the time my book was published (1984) this was the first -109 -major study of Nietzsche to engage his work from an explicitly feminist perspective. Now such an endeavor is no longer unusual, I'm glad to say. Either through the link with deconstructive philosophies (with respect to which Nietzsche was taken by Derrida and others to be a predecessor) and their interest in exploring "feminisms of difference," or through the expansion of feminist perspectives in the 1980s to include a multiplicity of feminist voices (not all arguing for strict equality or for an Enlightenment conception of justice), the connection between Nietzsche and feminism is no longer exceptional. This is something I celebrate whenever I get the chance! You could probably say the same about many other philosophers and theorists. For example, think of how the field of psychoanalytical feminism has flourished in the last few decades, despite many second-wave feminists' reservations about Freud's views on women. Bear in mind, I do not mean to exonerate Nietzsche for his anti-feminist sentiments. I am still remembered for the feminist critique of his politics that appeared in Beyond Nihilism. But Nietzsche's voice on the topic of women is not always steady. He addresses some issues of great complexity such as the social and cultural construction of femininity. I now believe that Nietzsche was aware of the instability of gender identityincluding that of his own masculinity-and that he assumed a hyper-masculine persona in many of his writings to compensate for this. But I am not really interested in psychoanalyzing Nietzsche. I don't think we get very far using that route.
Marquez: What do you find most appealing about Latin American philosophy?
Schutte: Speaking as someone born in Cuba (and therefore in Latin America), what I find most appealing is that this is a philosophy emerging from our own cultures, from our own part of the world. One of the problems I encountered in graduate school was that, despite the variety of courses and topics I could study and the degree of interest these topics could elicit in me, the course content seemed distant from the realities of my lived experience. There was a clear separation then between "being a philosopher" (or, as it applied to me, a "philosophy student") and being Cuban and female. Even though my dissertation advisor at Yale was ver y supportive of my incorporating my own voice in my work from the earliest startan approach for which I will always be grateful-it took years of writing and expanding my conceptual universe before I could bring to philosophy everything that I am, in view of my culture, gender, and ethnicity. My research on Latin American philosophy and social thought empowered me as a philosopher in a way no other field would have done, precisely because I could do philosophy with and through, rather than without and against, my cultural roots. I think most Anglo-American philosophers would feel significantly deprived if they were placed in a situation in which they had to disconnect themselves completely from their language and culture in order to do philosophy. Well, that's the way it was for us Latinas/os in the United States before the field of Latin American philosophy was recognized. In the U.S. you learned to do philosophy out of the culture you were taught in the schools, not the one you carried with you in your everyday life. It's a kind of amputation, which some feel much more than others. I was among those who felt it the most. For this reason I embraced the study of Latin American philosophy shortly after I became aware such a thing existed. At the time, I was an assistant professor at the University of Florida in Gainesville. As part of a teaching experiment, I offered the course "Latin American Philosophy" at the undergraduate level for the first time in the spring of 1980. That was less than two years after writing my dissertation on Nietzsche and completing my Ph.D.
Another aspect of Latin American philosophy that attracted me was its direct relevance to questions of cultural identity I was struggling with, both philosophically and personally. It turned out that the issue of cultural identity was a long-established philosophical and political question in Latin American culture, also connected to questions of dependence versus independence from Western colonialism and its aftermath. I could then situate my individual concerns in the context of a historical and philosophical framework that provided depth and meaning. The issue of cultural identity was such a burning question for me that for several years I researched the topic, spanning much of the twentieth century. My second book, Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought emerged from this research, some of which was conducted in Mexico as part of a Fulbright research fellowship.
Marquez: Why is it important to bring Latin American philosophy into the philosophical dialogue in the United States?
Schutte: It is not interesting for philosophy simply to be self-referential (in a cultural sense). We always need to search for what is outside an existing knowledge-base if we are to expand knowledge. Expanding the quest for knowledge beyond the confines of dominant and mainstream cultures and fields of knowledge is an important part of this venture. There is a sense today among many philosophers in the United States that the principle of inclusiveness should be applied to philosophical contributions stemming from Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, as well as the cultures of Native Americans, in order to enrich and expand the understanding of philosophy traditionally prevalent in universities in the United States. I concur with this assessment and in fact am serving a term in the newly constituted APA Committee on Inclusiveness, which aims to foster such dialogue.
Philosophy is a field that aims at a comprehensive understanding of reality. I find it contradictory for such a field to limit itself to the understanding generated by a fraction of the human race. For this reason, women's philosophizing from all parts of the world should also be encouraged and incorporated into the understanding of what is included in philosophy.
In the United States we now have a very diverse population in terms of ethnicity, race, national origin, and other factors. Our discipline will suffer if it remains isolated from the types of challenges and perspectives people of different backgrounds can bring to it. This is such a self-evident matter. It doesn't take a great deal of intelligence to figure this out; so, you might ask, why the delay in adopting dialogue as one of our foremost practices? I suppose part of the problem lies not only in obvious matters of territoriality and the exertion of dominant power. The issue is more complex insofar as even people with the best intentions may become strongly invested in a narrow view of what counts as knowledge-a view that they take to be both universal and normative for legitimating all claims to truth whatsoever. It is like a court that fails to admit any evidence whose form does not match the contours of what the court has previously seen. If such a view is rewarded and reinforced by peers, employers, highly respected journals, disciplinary ranking criteria and the like, it may keep everyone locked into an account of knowledge that fails to see the relevance of less recognized and/or innovative perspectives and fields. We need to make a concerted, systematic, and tireless effort to encourage openness.
Marquez: Nietzsche and Marx can be used respectively to get an understanding of how power works in the symbolic realm and in the material realm. The locus of your work seems to lie within a phenomenological-existential tradition that tends to put more emphasis on symbolic meaning rather than on material structure. However, much of Latin American philosophy and some feminist thought is influenced by Marxism's concern with the structural-material perspective on power. Is there a reason beyond contingencies of biography for your relative disregard of the materialist-structural concern(s), especially, given your explicit interest in liberation (however conceived)?
-110 -Schutte: You ask a very complex question that I will try to answer in parts. But first I would like to clarify that I don't believe it's correct to claim that in my work on Latin American philosophy I have disregarded (even relatively speaking) Marxism. In my book on Latin American social thought I devote approximately two out of seven chapters to an analysis of the origins of Latin American Marxism. No other position gets as much space. Feminism got one chapter and even within it a portion of it was devoted to Marxist feminism. I think you'll find I have paid a great deal more constructive attention to Marxism than most people in comparable circumstances as myself (Cuban-born philosophers in the United States). Moreover, the work I have done is qualitatively important regardless of the actual quantitative amount of space devoted to it. The reason for this is that if you study Marxism the way it is usually read in the United States I don't think you will understand Latin American Marxism and its various forms stemming from the different national contexts. The contribution I made to this field through the study of José Carlos Mariátegui, one of the most important and original Marxist thinkers in the history of Latin American thought, addresses just this gap in Western Marxist studies. Mariátegui is often compared to Gramsci in terms of the impact his thinking had on Marxist theory on the continent. Much of the Marxism arising in Latin America is a Marxism that Marx himself may not have imagined. In addition to providing this qualitative perspective, I incorporated this knowledge in a book whose overall topic was much broader than Marxism. This creates another significant type of contribution, namely, the practice of including Marxism among other approaches to philosophy for readers who for the most part are not Marxist. Many people in liberal institutions take the inclusion of Marxist perspectives in political theory for granted. Yet in fact at the time my book came out, the Soviet Union had recently dissolved. Marxist perspectives were strongly discredited in public opinion. It took a lot of courage at that time to give serious attention to Marxist scholarship even if this was historical scholarship. Now that the effects of capitalist globalization are becoming more evident, there has been a revival of Marxist analysis that gives it a new intellectual focus and legitimacy. But this has not always been the case.
While I agree with you that both Marx and Nietzsche have made important contributions to an analysis of power, this does not require me as a particular philosopher to use their texts in exactly equal proportions. What I think we should remember (in terms of your question) is that there has been a huge tradition in the history of philosophy (and then spilling into other fields such as critical theory and cultural studies) using Marx, Nietzsche (and Freud, in many cases) as points of departure for further theorizing about culture and power. Read Marcuse or Adorno and Horkheimer, for example, and see how these critical theorists were able to incorporate insights from Marx and Nietzsche as relevant to their specific analyses of culture. With regard to your comment on structural Marxism, while I include Althusser in some graduate seminars on the philosophy of culture and find his critique of state apparatuses quite informative, I disagree with him on the question of subjectivity, which Althusser confined to the realm of ideology. With Teresa de Lauretis (in Technologies of Gender), I take it that feminism does not fit into Althusser's analysis of knowledge and science. Lauretis shows that feminist theorists cannot be said to be completely outside ideology (in the Althusserian sense) because despite our criticism of traditional gender ideology, we often have been influenced by it in such a way that it is not possible to say we have escaped it altogether. I take this further to suggest (my own view) that there is no such thing as science strictly separate from ideology as Althusser argued and, furthermore, that issues of subjectivity and identity are just as legitimate as issues of so-called scientific knowledge for philosophy.
Feminism, too, has much to offer liberation theory. With regard to feminism, I have recently included contributions of socialist feminists to demonstrate the effects of capitalist globalization processes on women's lives, for example. 1 I will also refer to some of the Marxist roots of postcolonial theory when I write about postcolonial feminisms in my upcoming work. But, again, these are elements of a wider picture I develop and not the sole focus of my research. I don't discard the relevance or importance of a materialist approach, especially with respect to those aspects of social reality where it is pertinent, but neither do I reduce my own perspective to a materialist methodology or approach.
Marquez: You have recently been working in philosophy and women's studies. Has this changed your work in any way? What are some of the topics you are currently addressing?
Schutte:
Since the year 2000, I have published a number of essays and articles analyzing the impact of globalization processes on various issues related to development-whether the focus is on socially-centered issues such as feminism in Latin America, women's work in developing countries, and the critique of neo-liberal development, on the one hand, or on postcolonial subjectivity as it impacts our understanding of European continental philosophy or the identities of Latinas/os in the United States, on the other. I have stayed within my main areas of specialization in feminism, Latin American philosophy, and European continental philosophy, but at the same time shifting the method of approach so that it is more de-centered with respect to traditional philosophical boundaries and more focused on an interdisciplinary or cross-disciplinary approach.
Of special interest to this audience is a panel the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) held in 2001 as a "Scholar's Session" on my work. I was so honored by this recognition! The papers by professors Linda Alcoff, Debra Bergoffen, and Ann Ferguson, along with my response, can be found in a forthcoming (2004) issue of Hypatia. This symposium also addresses ways in which my work evolves from the perspective of a Latina/Latin American philosopher. Another forthcoming publication will be narrative in character. It tells, in rather compact form, some of the highlights of my career, focusing on the challenges and opportunities I have found as a Latina philosopher in the U.S. This, too, will be published in the near future in a collection containing autobiographical essays by a selection of women philosophers in the U.S. 2 During this period I have also completed a major essay, coauthored with María Luisa Femenías (University of La Plata, Argentina), on Latin American feminist philosophy. Unfortunately, this essay has been quite delayed insofar as it is part of a collection not yet ready for publication. This kind of delay can be ver y frustrating when you are doing groundbreaking work in a field, but I am sure it happens to many in academic publishing. In about a year, when I step down from my current job as chair of the department of Women's Studies at the University of South Florida, I look forward to having some time to write. I plan to put together a book of essays on postcolonial and Latin American feminisms. After that, who knows? I always have my hands full with all the interests I have developed across several areas of specialization. Even so, if I have the opportunity, I would like to do a book on Cuba-but not at all a conventional one.
Marquez: Many Third World scholars find themselves within the midst of the academic phenomenon of postcolonial studies. What points of confluence do you think exist between the concerns of feminists and postcolonialists?
Schutte: I am in the process of putting together an essay on postcolonial feminisms, so it is a bit premature to answer this question in all its complexity. The question that you pose presupposes that feminists and postcolonialists are two separate constituencies, but this is not always the case. Perhaps the problem lies in the fact that postcolonial studies have often been taught primarily from a male point of view. This is not an accurate representation of postcolonial studies, however, since one of the most important theorists in this field (in its critical aspect) is Gayatri Spivak, an internationally recognized feminist theorist. In the U.S., Chandra Mohanty and Uma Narayan are likewise celebrated as important postcolonial feminists, among others. At this point I also consider myself a postcolonial feminist, in the sense that I am a diasporic Cuban in the United States, writing at least since my second book on topics, among other things, amounting to the decolonization of Latin American culture. Feminists are not all of one kind, though. Just as there are class, ethnic, racial and other differences among feminists, so there may be differences posed by postcolonial issues and concerns. But what is true is that within the United States there is a link between the concerns of feminists identifying as women of color in the U.S. such as Chicana feminists and postcolonial feminists-immigrants and/or those active in transnational feminisms.
Marquez: You suggest in your essay "Continental Philosophy and Postcolonial Subjects" (in Mendieta, ed. Latin American Philosophy: Currents, Issues, and Debates, pp. 150-164, 2003) that there is a particular affinity between Latin American philosophy and postcolonial theory; can you expand? Is Latin American philosophy really postcolonial avant la lettre, as you seem to suggest in your essay?
Schutte: The meaning of postcolonial theor y and postcolonial studies is generally admitted to be somewhat imprecise-and at times hotly contested. The terms tend to be used at times ambiguously and, at any rate, in the absence of an agreed upon systematic definition. For this reason it is useful to break down some of the meanings of these terms into distinct components. For example, I think there are several points of entry into postcolonial theory if you wish to approach this topic in conjunction with Latin American philosophy. The first line of approach is historical. In this sense, the focus is the history of decolonization, primarily in the context of national struggles for independence from foreign rule. Within this category there are still different approaches to the interpretation both of history and of colonialism, so there are a number of distinct orientations that may be taken, but in the current framework in which decolonization is understood we are speaking for the most part about positions to the left of conventional middle class ideologies. A second point of entry is cultural. This category obviously overlaps with the former one, insofar as historical and cultural approaches to decolonization are mutually interdependent. Examples of Latin Americans who fit the first two categories' sense of postcolonial thinkers are José Martí in the 19 th century and Leopoldo Zea in the twentieth century. Specifically, Martí's concept of Nuestra América (our America) as distinct from both European and North American cultures, fits the concept of a postcolonial framework very well. Martí promoted a vision of "our America" completely inclusive of the indigenous and variously composed racial populations of Latin America and the Caribbean. I would say that this particular perspective can be significantly expanded to include (although, depending on the context, in a more diluted form) large numbers of Latin American intellectuals who in one way or another have addressed the questions of ethnic and racial difference with an aim to overcome the impact of colonialism and neo-colonialism as they theorize about Latin American philosophy or about the relations between Latin America and North America or Europe. The philosophies of liberation have a place here, as do many philosophical writings addressing politics, culture, the arts, and ethics-feminism included.
A second way to enter postcolonial studies and theory is through an unorthodox Third World Marxism. One of the most important figures from our part of the world whose work has been highlighted in postcolonial theory is the Martinican Frantz Fanon. But similarly in this category you could place a José Carlos Mariátegui, a "Che" Guevara, or a Roberto Fernández Retamar (author of Caliban). These are people whose notions of decolonization involve a socialist critique of imperialism, but for whom the vision of a new society and the humans who would inhabit it tends to contrast sharply with the centralized, bureaucratically administered, nationalisms characterizing what used to be the Second as well as many parts of the Third World. Sensitivity to the intersections of class, race, and ethnicity are important characteristics of this approach. In other words, class analysis alone is not sufficient to yield a strategy for attaining decolonization: racial and/or ethnic questions must be foregrounded as well.
Then there is a third way to enter postcolonial theory, which centers on the application of contemporary post-structuralist methods to analyze both colonial discourse and colonialist processes with an aim to deconstruct their impact and ideology. Among prominent Latin American intellectuals in this category are Walter Mignolo (USA/Argentina) and Nelly Richard (Chile). There will be few philosophers in this category unless poststructuralism and deconstruction are accepted as mainstream methods of doing philosophy in Latin America. Finally, I cannot say that these three points of entry are exhaustive since the meaning of postcolonial is still highly contested. But at least they can provide a sketch of the potential overlap that we may find between Latin American philosophy and postcolonial studies, most of which has not yet been explored explicitly. This is one of the areas to which I want to contribute in the near future.
Marquez: One of the things that you show in your essay "Cultural Alterity: Cross-Cultural Communication and Feminist Thought in North-South Dialogue" (in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 13:2 (1998), 53-72) is how the construction of the Other boxes subalterns in self-definitions that may or may not match their own senses of themselves. Can you explain to what extent, if any, this problem is more acute in the case of the construction of the subaltern "Other" than in the case of the construction of the dominant "I"?
Schutte: Perhaps what you mean is whether the "I" pertaining to someone placed in a hierarchically dominant social position is boxed in differently from the "I" in a hierarchically non-privileged or even abjected category, and if so, in what ways? To me the answer is relatively self-evident due to the fact that there are asymmetrical power relations between the social positions occupied by these two hypothetical individuals. Simone de Beauvoir did a splendid job in The Second Sex, for example, showing that what she termed the "situation" of women in a masculine-dominant society clearly overdetermines the limitations on the exercise of a woman's individual freedom. Likewise, in Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre made the famous observation that "if the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him." (We know exactly what sense of "Jew" Sartre means in this sentence, namely, the abjected Jew, the target of Nazi hatred and prejudice). Racism overdetermines the identity conditions of those it targets as objects of racist prejudice, the same as colonialism does toward the colonized and masculine dominance does toward women. True, we are speaking at a macro level and here and there we may find exceptions, but generally the person in the subaltern position must fight both the normal types of prejudice to which anyone in a society may be subject and, what is specific to their case, the targeted prejudices to which only those in their group or social category are subject. Fanon and many others have described and analyzed such prejudices eloquently.
Now if we move one step further theoretically and reframe this discussion from the standpoint of post-structuralism, similar consequences may be derived regarding the over-determination of the subaltern's identity even if the theoretical framework shifts from the discourse of identity and the individual subject to that of representation and the speaker of a particular language. You will then see that those situated in privileged speaking positions will have access to a culture's goods and services, even if some violence is experienced as a result of their assuming such speaking positions. In contrast, the subaltern speaker does not have access to the same goods and services, is unable to function within the norms of the privileged representation of what constitutes a human subject, and may even be barred from inclusion in the dominant culture's repertoire of accepted symbolic goods and components. Kristeva's work in Strangers to Ourselves on accepting the "stranger [or foreigner] within," meaning both within oneself (especially if one is part of the privileged) and within one's country (if one is a native citizen) is tremendously important. In this case, the "foreigner" may come to signify the subaltern, at least in an abstract sense. But as for "self " and "other," as I explain in my article, these positions are not stable. They shift depending on who is speaking and on the specific cultural/social/political context.
Marquez: Do you see a way of using the idea of an economy of excess, as opposed to an economy of lack, to radicalize the postcolonial critique? My point is that perhaps not only the subaltern "Other" is a hybrid being but also the dominant "I." And if this is the case, perhaps politically effective coalitions can be enacted not only between indigenous groups, feminist groups, queer groups and non-Western groups, but also between these and the non-hegemonic voices within the allegedly monolithic dominant, male, Western "I."
Schutte: I do start out from the Kristevan premise, which is basically post-Freudian, regarding the "differences" within the self. But because the Freudian self is a product of the European cultural imaginary and symbolic orders, to this extent the self that is postulated as having internal differences constituting it (which it may reject in unhealthy ways) is already part of (or symbolically related to, if it is female) what you call the dominant male Western "I." There are certainly people within this relatively privileged social sector who support the struggles of those who have been denied opportunities by the very social sectors of which they are a part. So, yes, what you propose is not only possible. It seems to happen quite often, though not as often as we would like. Post-structuralist psychoanalytic theory as developed by Kristeva already provides a framework for the phenomenon of potential solidarity you describe here. But as philosophers we need to be aware that it does so on a case-bycase basis. Kristeva is guided by an ethics of psychoanalysis embedded in a therapeutic model focusing on one individual at a time. As to your suggestion about appealing to an economy of excess, and thereby making the model more general, what I see is that the category of excess is broader in meaning and scope than the particular application you want to make of it (namely, solidarity of the hegemonous individual with the subaltern). In the model you suggest there needs to be something more specific that channels the "excess" toward this particular ethical or political direction. At this point I think you need an ethics recognizing the importance of solidarity toward groups that are marginalized, abused, or exploited on the basis of cultural, ethnic, racial, sexual, and other comparable differences.
Marquez: If something like this is possible, do you see this as representing some kind of recuperation of a positive universal struggle for liberation of a kind that would be congenial to Nietzsche's critique of the life-denying force of Western metaphysics and culture, without the ugly sides of Nietzsche's politics?
Schutte: In my view you would have to go well beyond Nietzsche to reach this point because I am not sure he could have conceived a universal struggle for liberation from Western metaphysics. Surely he conceived of such a struggle but on individual, selective, and partial, rather than universal grounds.
Marquez: Latino/a philosophers find it difficult to gain acceptance into the philosophy guild in the U.S. Normally this phenomenon has been explained in terms of racial-cultural prejudice/discrimination. However, given my own personal experience, I have come to de-emphasize the racial-cultural cause in favor of a philosophical-cultural one. To me, Latino philosophers are marginalized more than anything else due to their own philosophical preferences. In particular, I see as the fundamental discriminator y features four philosophical commonalities: (1) their concern with the connections between philosophy and lived experience; (2) their methodological deemphasis of strict definition and narrow logical argumentation;
(3) their adherence to a programmatic style, emphasizing the elaboration of constructive proposals over the endless exercise of scholarly dissection of the academic literature; and (4) their eclecticism, intellectual restlessness, and philosophical venturesomeness. Latino/a philosophers are marginalized in U.S. academia, but so are most phenomenology, existentialist, Marxist, and feminist philosophers. To me, the problem seems to be philosophical narrow-mindedness and a very small view of what an intellectual is and does in contemporary American society. So how important do you think race-culture is as an explanation of the Latino/a philosopher/s condition?
Schutte: In my view there is no logical reason why Latinas/os are marginalized in philosophy. I think it is a mistake to try to make up for the absence of a logical reason by attributing the problem to what you call Latinas/os' philosophical preferences, even if in so doing you try to demonstrate the narrowness of how philosophy is often viewed by specialists in the U.S. Rather than rationalize existing practices that marginalize Latinas/os we should call attention to the absurdity of such practices. I am also skeptical of attributing to Latina/o philosophers as a group a series of traits that appear to essentialize our attitudes toward philosophy, for this may lead to further stereotyping of Latinas/os in ways that damage, rather than help, our deserved recognition as philosophers. Even if some Latina/o philosophers were to claim these attributes as their own, these beliefs might not supersede other aspects of their philosophical identities. In such cases, the attributes could be misleading, taking our identities out of context.
Of course, I take it that, as a matter of strength, your point reveals that for Latin American culture (in contrast to the practices of the neo-liberal U.S. academy) philosophy means something broader, more relevant to the world, more accomplished in humanistic scholarship, and closer to the root meaning of philosophia, implying a love of wisdom. As Latina/ o philosophers, I believe we should be proud of this heritage. In fact, I think this heritage gives us strength and endurance in facing many of the problems some of us encounter professionally. I am sure many North American philosophers welcome our understanding of philosophy. I do notice a gap in practice, however, between the acceptance, in principle, of this view of philosophy and the narrowly technical definitions of what counts as philosophy applied in many philosophy departments. It is the latter that creates problems.
By the way, the APA web page shows data of Ph.D.s awarded in philosophy by gender, race, and ethnicity between 1991 and 1996. Over the length of these six years, an average of fewer than 8 Ph.D.s per year were awarded to Latinas/os, constituting only about two and a half percent of all the Ph.D.s awarded in philosophy during this period. I think you can see the problem we have in this profession, even though I do expect our numbers to keep growing. Is the problem a matter primarily attributable to racism and ethnic prejudice as factors of professional exclusion? Or is it simply a matter of philosophical methodology as a factor of professional exclusion, which then takes a heavier toll among Latinas/os than among Anglo Americans? I believe it can be any one of the above as well as both combined. The fact that you may have methodological exclusionary practices does not necessarily rule out racism, nor does the presence of racial or ethnic prejudice necessarily rule out methodological discrimination. And there may be other factors besides these: for example, gender discrimination. But I will try to speak directly to the factors you mention in your question.
Methodological discrimination affects a much larger group than Latinas/os. Strictly speaking, however, it should not affect Latinas/os who are either following the accepted philosophical methods or those working in departments that are methodologically inclusive. Fortunately, at the University of South Florida where I work currently, the philosophy department is inclusive, so I feel quite comfortable as a specialist in all my areas of specialization, just as it should be. In my broader professional experience, I have found that methodological discrimination can be very serious when it affects people like myself using under-represented methodologies, primarily those trained in European continental philosophy and using methods such as hermeneutics, deconstruction, and psychoanalysis in various degrees in their philosophical work. (Exclusion of Marxists and feminists, in contrast, may take place for political, not just methodological, reasons). Others susceptible to marginalization, although less so than the former groups, are specialists in continental critical theory and in Foucauldian discourse analysis, or even specialists in the history of philosophy whose approach is not what one might call "hard-core" analytic.
The issue of methodological discrimination differs from racism in at least two significant ways. First, it is not illegal. Second, it is carried out overtly. People are told up front that they are not doing philosophy because they are not following the correct method-let's say logical analysis and its derivatives. Methodological discrimination is ambiguous in the sense that it can easily target women and minorities without naming as the source of the action a person's gender, race, ethnic identity, or national origin. Nevertheless, there is probably no greater offense to many people's philosophical identities than to be told repeatedly in public that what they do is not philosophy, or that they are deficient in analyzing a problem because they fail to use the right method or the proper logical reasoning. These attitudes create a hostile climate for the persons targeted as methodologically deviant from the accepted norm. Some leave the profession; some leave their place of employment and move on to another job; some switch to a different department or to an interdisciplinary program that will show respect for their philosophical work, and so on.
Would you say racism or ethnic discrimination is not involved when the persons targeted also happen to belong to a racial or ethnic minority, or that it is not sexism when the persons targeted are feminist women? Or can you prove, on the contrary, that it is indeed racism, ethnic discrimination, or sexism? Usually people say you can only prove the latter if you find a documented proof of racism, sexism, or ethnic discrimination. But in today's U.S. university, is anyone going to say overtly to a woman or member of a minority group: you don't belong here because you are a [name the targeted group]. Since no one will say this in the open, then you probably need to look at other contingencies, such as: if individuals pertaining to that group are not present or are present only in very reduced numbers; or if individuals in that group are earning far less than their white male colleagues; or if, after a member of that group leaves a department, there are no future hires appointing members of the same group, especially to the same or higher rank; or if, before the individual leaves a department, the chair fails to negotiate a counteroffer truly matching the individual's accomplishments, and so on. When you take all these other factors into consideration, you begin to see the difference between a receptive and a hostile environment for philosophers of underrepresented gender, ethnicity, or race (or of more than one of these factors combined). I think that today most academics have come to expect that they will not have to work in a hostile department and that marginalization will not be tolerated as a condition of their employment. We should not be in the business of rationalizing our own marginalization. On the contrary, we need to make it known that marginalization is not acceptable to us, as I have done here, explicitly. Then let the profession, including the more prestigious universities, figure out, if they care to ask, what it takes to attract and retain us. If they don't, let the absence of Latina/o philosophers in their ranks remain their embarrassment.
Marquez: My previous question suggests the strong, deep and, thus, sometimes inscrutable connections between sociopolitics and metaphysics. So let me ask you a metaphysical question that I think is at the center of this issue: Do you think that language is the house of philosophy or do you think that life is the house of philosophy?
Schutte: At the risk of indulging in figurative language, I will give you a Nietzschean feminist answer: philosophy has no house; philosophy is nomadic. Philosophy is a wanderer and a world traveler. It cannot be trapped anywhere, not even in its own temporary dwellings. It may rest here and there for a few decades or a few centuries, but it is always already elsewhere and on the move. It speaks a multiplicity of languages. If it must have a house, it has more than one house and is always on the go among them. Logic (not to be equated with philosophy) does appear to have a lodging. Nietzsche suggested it was grammar-to which he added ironically that philosophers will continue to believe in God as long as they believe in grammar.
Marquez: And do you think that the contemporar y university is the home of philosophy or philosophy's prison? Is philosophy, like Nietzsche seems to evoke, an untamed nomadic creature, ill suited for indoors and a single dwelling place?
Schutte: I answered the previous question without yet reading this one. You can already see where I am coming from. With respect to the first part of your question, I think today's universities are some of those temporary houses I mentioned in the previous paragraph. Some are built better than others; some would altogether fail a metaphysical inspection. I leave it to your imagination to decide how to rank them. With regard to the second part of your question, yes, I agree it's nomadic but I don't recall Nietzsche calling it an untamed creature. For certain, a building's walls are not so much a prison as they are indifferent to philosophy. Philosophy has a place both in and outside classrooms.
Marquez: Many of Nietzsche's metaphors, such as doing philosophy "with a hammer," are images that can be construed as violent. In addition, you have done work on the ethics of care and you have described yourself as having a relatively nonaggressive style of philosophical engagement. Finally, much non-academic feminist work done worldwide is directed against different forms of violence against women-against women's bodies, but also against women's minds. What is your take on the place of violence in human life? What it is. What it should be. What it can be. To put it more specifically, can you spell out how it would look like to have an active notion of life, an account of regeneration, reproduction, and rebirth, and a female cyclical notion of time, that takes into consideration active creation and destruction in a way that is compatible with a feminist notion of love, care, and non-violence? Is the self-affirmation of life itself intrinsically dangerous-with violence as a necessar y component of it? And, more specifically, can the life-affirming goal of a Nietzsche-inspired feminism do without the exercise of violence? Can an economy of empowerment be divorced from an economy of violence? Or is it the case that, like some Freudians would have it, an economy of excess has to give a place both to Eros and to Thanatos, to love/care and to violence? Schutte: I suppose you are asking me to reconcile my feminist views on care and non-violence with Nietzsche's apparent justification of violence. At this point, some people think my views on non-violence are quite unNietzschean. If so, it does not trouble me. I have already said I have a hybrid identity both culturally and philosophically. But let me spell out, in a very preliminary way, an answer to at least some your questions. In the amount of time I have for this interview (it comes down to just a few hours!) all I can offer are preliminary observations, some of which I may need to rethink later.
The term violence does not have a stable meaning. Some people have a much higher sensitivity to violence than others, in part depending on the amount of pain they believe a living organism is capable of suffering, or on their beliefs about the nature of the rights that should protect them against purported acts of violence. In Nietzsche's case, he lowers the sensitivity in both respects. He regards at least some pain as a product of social conditioning, so that what a woman, for example, may consider painful is not at all painful to a man. At the same time, he is not specifically concerned about the question of rights in a traditionally moral sense. He looks at rights as conventionally established and therefore not necessarily intrinsic to a universalizable, essential human nature. In this sense, one might say rights are socially constructed to fit human interests, or rather, the interests of the more powerful. Given any set of human interests and the prevailing conditions of power relations among social sectors and classes at any given time, a rhetoric of rights gets invoked or implemented. Nietzsche distrusts most, if not all, forms of moral justification, as a result of which he would distrust moral justifications offered either on behalf of or against violence. At first glance, it would seem that Nietzsche's view is not very helpful. But it has two important strengths, despite its obvious limitations: (1) it helps us to be skeptical about the many moral justifications offered by people, some of whom are supposedly highly reputable in the eyes of the public, yet whose use of moral justification has absolutely no moral weight when it comes to a credible argument; (2) it disentangles the case for or against taking an action from the premises of the binary reasoning of "good versus evil," having noted the latter is a product of a "slave" and reactive morality. In a way, Nietzsche's reasoning seems to clear the way for anything whatsoever to be justifiable, except that the relativity of this exercise means that we should distrust the justifications we are offered by others and think things through as independently as possible in terms of our own strengths in handling and understanding a broad multiplicity of perspectives, along with their implications. Metatheoretically, one could argue that his epistemic perspectivism, which is normative for him with respect to assessing claims to truth, at least in principle should temper some of the claims he makes regarding violence.
Schopenhauer seems to have thought that the act of willing itself could already be construed metaphysically as cruel and violent, insofar as any form of life that wills its own survival must also will the destruction of other organisms to keep on living. On this view, asceticism would end up representing the highest possible moral practice. I think Nietzsche reacted specifically and somewhat dramatically to this view by countering that, if willing involves cruelty, then cruelty is part of life and life itself is violent. Philosophically, however, he framed his affirmation of life in the context of undermining and opposing asceticism. This involves celebrating the flux of life and, yes, with it destruction and becoming.
But I think it is one thing to celebrate "becoming" in a metaphysical sense (including the view that every act of creation also involves destruction) and another to celebrate violence. I think there is a gap between these two positions and, as a feminist, I can accept the first while also categorically rejecting the second. In this way my view differs significantly from Nietzsche's because at times he moves from the first to the second or conversely without any seeming difficulty. My view may also differ from those of other feminists, some of whom may be more pacifist than myself, others of whom may endorse much more aggression. Feminism itself is not a homogeneous view, although as a rule feminists oppose the abhorrent practices that we call "violence against women."
So that my answer may not be overly extensive, let me take the case of war as an example. For the sake of the argument, let us say that war necessarily involves violence. As a feminist who supports non-violence, what should my position be with respect to war? I would very much like to say that I oppose all wars, although at the present stage of humankind this is not a realistic position. There is much oppression still in the world and, when people are oppressed, they have a right to free themselves from this oppression. I do admire the proponents of peaceful civil disobedience as an alternative to war, but this strategy is not always feasible. So I end up accepting the position of someone like José Martí, Cuba's leader in the 1895 War of Independence against Spain, who characterized that particular anti-colonial war as a necessary one, despite the fact that ideally we should avoid war and always, whenever possible, work for peace. I also think people have the right of self-defense and that on certain occasions the use of violence in self-defense may be justified. But by contrast I think the recent war of the U.S. and its coalition forces against Iraq was not justified. There did not seem to be a compelling reason for the military intervention when political negotiation and U.N.led inspections may have achieved the desired results demanded by the international community. I think the U.S. as a superpower gets itself in situations where it lets "can" imply and determine "ought." Because it can strike, it strikes, to which it then adds a moral justification invoking good against evil. This type of justification for war and violence is very flawed. It can be used by anyone regardless of political conviction or belief. It hurts me to see so many people in this country, apparently well intended, support such a policy. It also hurts me to see people in other parts of the world use the same flawed reasoning to attack "enemies." For this reason I strongly support nonviolence.
With regard to feminist alternatives to violence, have you seen Michael Moore's Bowling for Columbine? This documentary film, I think, clearly shows that we are living in one of the most violent societies and countries in the developed world today. Children going into schools and killing other children is a case in point. How is it even possible to "think peace" (in a strong and not merely weak way) in the midst of this violence? I don't take Freud to be arguing at all for a balance between Eros and Thanatos. He saw what the world was coming to at the beginning of the Nazi period and he appealed for Eros to override the death drives. I think Freud was quite aware that both the aggressive and the erotic drives had to undergo a process of sublimation if civilization was to flourish. In the United States today, we are clearly not providing a society where a process of sublimation, or its equivalent, takes place in a healthy manner. Problems such as poverty, sexism, and racism are not only probable causes of violence in their own right, but are themselves products and constant reminders of institutional violence. It is not enough to change our personal outlook on life; institutions, too, need to be changed. Education is an ideal way to try to reach people to raise their level of awareness about these matters. But education itself is in danger, with huge budget cuts affecting the programs universities and schools can offer, and the humanities increasingly under attack for apparently encouraging the value of independent and critical thinking.
The times in which we live are both difficult and challenging. We have a role to play in them, as philosophers. But we are few in number and we need allies. Among ourselves, we should also set an example and work on behalf of recognizing and including the ideas and needs of actual and potential members of our profession whose membership in various social groups make it likely that they have suffered discrimination due to their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, disability, and similar factors.
Marquez: Do you think that Latinos have some sort of unique historical memory that grants them a special insight into the fate of Empires that would allow them to assume a particular attitude towards the kind of brash, arrogant, and macho politics that the present administration has assumed with great relish and no reservations?
Schutte: The concept of historical memor y that you mention plays a very important role in Latin American political culture. I see very active manifestations of it, for example, in Chile and Argentina, where the "historical memory" of the crimes committed during the military regimes these countries experienced in the 1970s and/or early 1980s is kept alive through numerous cultural manifestoes and observances, and where the memory of those killed and/or "disappeared" is invoked repeatedly to try to prevent such crimes from ever happening again. But it takes a strong and steady effort and a conscious and unbreakable political will to keep such a historical memory alive, as we can learn from the experiences of the people of Chile and Argentina, including in the latter the madres and abuelas of the Plaza de Mayo. It is not easy or pleasant to keep this memory alive. Certainly, the former perpetrators and others who collaborated with them will try to do everything possible to make sure this memory is wiped out of the country's political identity. Those who maintain this memory alive do so because they are outraged at what happened and they vow not to let it happen again. There is a collective sense of grief as well as a collective desire for social justice that is awakened and energized by such a historical memory. Moreover, whether the people who maintain such a historical memory alive are fully aware of it or not, there is an added twist to the criminal events that took place in Chile and Argentina (as elsewhere in the Southern Cone and throughout several countries of Central America), and that is the fact that the U.S. government was backing the anti-democratic regimes whose human rights records we find so abhorrent. To return to your question: I do not think it is just the present U.S. administration that has problems with its exertion of power or with the posture of arrogance. Since the Spanish-American war of 1898 the U.S. has intervened militarily countless times in various Latin American and Caribbean countries in order to carry out its political, military, and economic agenda. And then of course, the problem is much larger than this since, as we know, all the countries that today make up the "new" world, including the U.S., were founded on prior acts that European conquerors and colonizers perpetrated against the indigenous populations of the continents that today we call the Americas. The arrogance of power has had many faces throughout history, but certainly we are alive at this time and we have a certain civic and moral responsibility to call attention to current political problems.
To what extent are people, whether or not they are Latino/a, likely to preserve and abide by the lessons of such a historical memory? I think it is a significant ethical challenge to preserve such a memory in this country, if only because in the U.S. we live in a society that tries continually to rewrite the past in terms of its current material and political interests. Immigrants from less economically advantaged lands, particularly, are susceptible to the seductive and false promise that the sooner we forget our past, the sooner we will grow rich and famous in this new country. I hope it is a strength of Latinos/as to remain aware and respectful of our historical memory and knowledge as we have seen it demonstrated in recent decades by so many good people in Chile and Argentina, for example. But I also hope it is something ever yone else who has an ethical conscience will try to achieve because, if this is a good thing to have-if this makes us nobler and better human beings as well as strong critics of opportunism and arrogance-we want such a good to be embraced by as many people as possible.
Marquez: As the Latino population hits the 40 million mark, according to recent reports from the Census Bureau, both Latinos and the US in general face a series of new challenges: a new civil rights agenda, economic-political justice in a time of diminishing expectations, and so on. What do you think is going to be the most pressing agenda that Latinos should be working towards as we begin a new millennium?
Schutte: Speaking as a citizen and a member of civil society (since I am not an expert in this branch of knowledge), I would say the agenda will need to address both issues of distributive justice and issues of political representation if there is going to be any progress for Latinas/os as well as other groups whose members experience significant poverty and political underrepresentation. One of the problems of political representation in this country, as has been observed by specialists, is that it is territorially based. That is, the forty million you mention will only have a chance at political representation comparable to others if political districts are drawn around large enclaves of Latina/o populations. As we know, politicians are constantly tinkering with district boundaries and often some absurd districts have been invented to maintain the balance of seats in the hands of the ruling party in power. So, think about it. While forty million in the minds of corporate executives does represent a significant consumer group (and there are many issues here too regarding consumer image manipulation and representation), the same number does not necessarily count as the basis for political representation. It seems to me that one of the first items on the agenda must be a mechanism precisely to acquire effective political representation.
Apart from the above, there is a long list of items that need to be negotiated. Obviously access to and provision of quality health services and of education from primary to tertiary/ advanced levels is a necessity. Others include: deactivation of immigration-related penalties restricting access to health care or education; the widening of options for attaining legal immigration; welfare rights for those in need, including women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities; access to treatment for depression and other forms of mental illness affecting many women and the elderly; normalization of civil status and benefits for farm-workers, migrant workers, and their children; access to credit and home ownership; credit for startup businesses; access to job opportunities and benefits across the hierarchy of jobs available, with plenty of opportunities for promotion and job security; representation of Latinas/os in fields such as education, the medical and legal professions, science, technology, and government; appointment of progressively minded judges to local, regional, and federal positions, as well as to the Supreme Court; continued legitimation of the Spanish language; support for programs in public schools that both teach English to non-English speakers and maintain Latinas/os' competence in their native languages; and representation in all aspects of media production and diffusion, including the advertising branches of business and media.
The areas where Latinas/os are already known, such as sports, popular music, entertainment, and so on, can always improve in terms of promoting Latinas/os to decision-making and managerial or ownership positions, just as any other field can benefit from this principle. I am sure I have forgotten many important things, so I'm happy if someone else adds to this list! As for the advancement specifically of Latinas, women and girls definitely need access to quality health care and assurance of their reproductive rights. Women cannot advance in life if their reproductive health is not in order. This means that women's rights need to be part of the Latina/o agenda. Families must forego the old habit of sending only their sons to collegedaughters need to be treated with equal consideration. We also need to make sure that darker skinned and Black Latinas/ os are just as included in Latina/o agendas as light-skinned Latinas/os. There are a lot of restrictions in the Hispanic/Latino/ a media about representing Latinas/os of unconventional appearance or life-style. For example, sexual orientation is presumed to be heterosexual.
As you see, Latinas/os have many traits and conditions in common with other members of U.S. civil society. What we need are progressive agendas especially in terms of guaranteeing distributive justice to all the vulnerable members of society. Among these, I count, of course, equal opportunity and affirmative action. But we should not think of ourselves as isolated within our own concerns because the truth is that our concerns are actually representative of the whole spectrum of the U.S. population and we need to form alliances with others whose concerns are similar. In the near future, the U.S. population will look more like us and less the way it looked one or two hundred years ago. We are representative of this country's future. It is time we were recognized as such and welcomed with open arms across this society.
Marquez: It's been a pleasure talking to you. Thank you very much for your time.
Schutte: Thank you so much for inviting me.
Endnotes
